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I. INTRODUCTION
A difficult problem challenging trial judges in recent years
has been the increased incidence of intentionally disruptive be-
havior by defendants in the criminal courtroom. Such disruption
is detrimental to the interests of both the state and the defend-
ant in having the defendant's guilt or innocence determined
without the intrusion of extraneous influences and in administer-
ing criminal justice with order and dispatcl Thus, since the
judge bears the ultimate responsibility for the proceedings, it is
his obligation to use his judicial power to prevent distractions
from and disruptions of the trial
In Illinois v. Allen' the Supreme Court substantially resolved
the question of which procedures may be used by trial judges to
control disruptive conduct. Specifically, citation for contempt,2
binding and gagging, and removal of the defendant from the
courtroom were approved as constitutionally permissible methods
of controlling disruptive defendants.3 The determination of what
conduct constitutes disruption and what method of control should
be used was held to lie largely within the discretion of the trial
judge.4
It is the thesis of this note that it is inappropriate to relegate
the control of disruptive defendants to the discretion of trial
judges without guidelines designed to minimize the abridgement
of constitutional rights that may result from the imposition of
controls sanctioned in Allen. The approach will be, first, to
examine the law prior to Allen to demonstrate that the use of the
approved controls may abridge rights recognized as important
constitutional protections of the accused. Second, an analysis
of Allen will suggest that although certain limitations on the
trial judge's discretion are implicit in the Court's opinion, they
are inadequate to protect the rights of the accused. Third, guide-
1. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
2. In using the term "citation for contempt," the Court apparently
was treating the term as synonymous with summary conviction for con-
tempt. See cases cited in note 26 infra regarding summary conviction.
3. 397 U.S. at 343-44.
4. Id. at 343, 347.
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lines will be suggested which hopefully will aid judges in deter-
mining how to control disruptive conduct without unnecessarily
abridging the defendant's constitutional rights.5
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO ALLEN
A. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT To BE PRESENT
A fundamental right of any defendant under criminal pro-
secution is the right to be personally present at the proceedings
against him.6 This right is implicit in the Sixth Amendment
5. It is, of course, true that it was not necessary for the Supreme
Court in deciding Allen to establish guidelines to be observed when dis-
ruptive defendants are sanctioned since only the propriety of trial after
the exclusion of an unruly defendant was at issue. On the other hand,
in approving as constitutionally permissible methods of controlling dis-
ruption, not only exclusion, the method used in Allen, but also con-
tempt and binding and gagging, the Court went beyond what was
strictly necessary for a decision of the case. Furthermore, it is apparent
that a Supreme Court decision is vastly more that simply a decision of
the particular case before it and that the opinion will be looked to by
lower courts for guidance in a wide variety of situations. Thus it is not
unfair to say that the Allen Court's concern over when and how the
Allen controls will be used was inadequate.
6. In Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892), the Supreme
Court said that "[a] leading principle that pervades the entire law of
criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be
done in the absence of the prisoner." The right to be personally present
at one's trial did not originate with the enactment of the Sixth Amend-
ment, but is one of the oldest common law rights. See 2 W. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 650 (2d ed. 1898); Goldin,
Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases,
16 COLUM. L. REV. 18 (1916). The importance of the right is indicated
by its protection by constitution or statute in every jurisdiction in the
United States.
At common law the defendant's right to be personally present was
characterized as the right to confront his accusers, and as such is pro-
tected by the constitutions of many jurisdictions: ALA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 6; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 11; FLA. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS § 11; GA. CONST. § 2-105; HAWAII
CONST. art. 1, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. II; IOWA
CONST. art. 1, § 10; KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS § 10; LA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 9; MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 21; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
MISS. CONST. art. 1, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16; N.H. CONST. Pt. 1,
art. 15; N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, sec. 20; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 9; R.I. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONST.
art. 1, § 18; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 22.
Statutory provisions protecting the same right include: NEv. REV.
STAT. § 169.160 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2405 (1956); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-1-8(1) (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6501 (1959); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.060 (1961). Other statutes specifically protect
the right of the defendant to be personally present at his trial: ALAS.
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right to confront one's accusers and therefore can be said to be
a constitutional right in itself. The requirement serves a number
of interests: (1) the presence of the defendant helps create a
moral force in the courtroom that inhibits adverse witnesses
from lying; (2) the defendant's presence may increase the ef-
fectiveness of his defense by allowing instantaneous communica-
tion of his reaction to adverse evidence to his attorney and by
enabling him to observe the vigor of the defense presented in his
behalf;8 and (3) the rule insures to some extent that the jury
will be able to observe the defendant's demeanor during the trial
and that the defendant will be able to poll the jury after rendi-
tion of the verdict 9 However, a majority of jurisdictions now
allow the defendant to waive his right to personal presence in all
but capital cases on the theory that the rule requiring his pres-
ence is for his own personal benefit,1 0 and a few jurisdictions
R. CRIm. P. 38; ARiz. R. Cenv. P. 231; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1043 (1960);
DEL. SUPER. CT. (Cram.) R. 43; F!LA. STAT. ANN. § 914.01 (1967); IDAHo
CODE §§ 19-106, 19-903 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1801 (1956); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 777.19 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1411 (1964); Ky. I
CRnv. P. 8.28; ME. IL Cnv_. P. 43 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278,
§ 6 (1959); MIcE Comv. LAws § 768.3 (1968); MimN. STAT. § 631.01(1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.030 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 94-
4806 (1947); NEBR. REv. STAT. § 29-2001 (1956); N.Y. CODE CRLN. PROC.§ 356 (McKinney 1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-16-03 (1960); O~no REv.
CODE ANN. § 2945.12; Oi.A. STAT. ANN. tit 22, § 583 (1969); OaE. REV.
STAT. § 136.040 (1967); S.C. CODE A.. § 17.506 (1967); S.D. CownuD
LAws ANN. § 23-42-1 (1967); TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2001, 40-2405 (1955);
TEX. CODE CPmL Pnoc. art. 33.03 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-3
(1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1.240 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.45.040
(1961); W. Va. CODE ANN. § 42-3-2 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.07
(1957); Wyo. R. CRmw. P. 42.
7. E.g., State v. Lonergan, 201 Ore. 163, 173, 269 P.2d 491, 496
(1954).
8. Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 448 (1891) (dictum); In Re
Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 672-73, 335 P.2d 657, 660-61 (1959); Miles v. State,
222 Ind. 312, 314-15, 53 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1944).
9. Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. 769, 771 (1897).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Dalli, 424 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); Arizona v. Hunt, 408 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969); Glouser v. United States, 296 F.2d 853
(8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 824 (1962); State v. Taylor, 104
Ariz. 264, 451 P.2d 312 (1969); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d
244 (1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 954 (1971); Cole v. State, 199 So. 2d
480 (Fla. App. 1967); Anderson v. State, 103 Ga. App. 83, 118 S.E.2d 381(1961); People v. Steenbergen, 31 Ill. 2d 615, 203 N.E.2d 404 (1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965); State v. Chuning, 201 Kan. 784, 443
P.2d 248 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 (1969); People v. Gant, 363
Mich. 407, 109 N.W.2d 873 (1961); People v. Columbani, 255 N.Y.S.2d
906, 22 A.D.2d 956, aff d, 16 N.Y.2d 1055, 266 N.Y.S.2d 129, 213 N.E.2d 460
(1965); State v. Rohrich, 135 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1965); Reed v. State,
172 Tex. Crim. 122, 353 S.W.2d 850 (1962); Ramer v. State, 40 Wis. 2d
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allow waiver even in capital cases." Waiver may be manifested
by express language or by conduct,1 2 but it must be clear and
unequivocal'" -the defendant must make an "intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right.' 1 4
B. THE RIGHT To BE FREE OF PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS
In addition to his right to personal presence, the defendant
has the right to appear before the jury free of physical re-
straints.15 The primary objection to the use of restraints is that
they tend to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury by
diminishing the presumption of innocence that he is supposed to
enjoy."6 Also, the more severe forms of restraint such as binding
79, 161 N.W.2d 209 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969).
A few jurisdictions have taken the position that the right to presence
is not subject to waiver on the theory that the requirement of presence
is for the benefit of the state as well as the accused. Journigan v. State,
223 Md. 405, 164 A.2d 896 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 853 (1961); Booze
v. State, 390 P.2d 261 (Okla. Crim. 1964); Boner v. Boles, 148 W. Va.
802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645 (1914); People
v. De Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956); Boreing v. Beard, 226
Ky. 47, 10 S.W.2d 447 (1928); Thomas v. State, 117 Miss. 532, 78 So. 147
(1918).
12. United States v. Blount, 339 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1964); Henzel v.
State, 212 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1085, reh. denied,
394 U.S. 967 (1969); People v. Allen, 37 Ill.2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
13. Berness v. State, 263 Ala. 641, 83 So. 2d 613 (1955); People v.
Semecal, 264 Cal. App. 2d 985, 69 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1968).
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Harven v. United
States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gaiten v. Stahl, 327 F. Supp. 415
(W.D. N.C. 1971). See generally Comment, Criminal Waiver: The
Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence, and Legitimate
State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1966). For an analysis of the
erosive impact of Illinois v. Allen and other recent Supreme Court deci-
sions on the waiver doctrine see Tigar, The Supreme Court-1969 Term
-Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 10 Am. R. 296, (1871); Blair v. Com-
monwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390 (1916); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591(1877); State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 50 P. 580 (1897); cf. Eaddy v.
People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P.2d 717 (1946) (defendant dressed in prison
uniform); People v. Du Plissey, 380 Mich. 100, 155 N.W.2d 850 (1968)
(restraints on co-defendants); State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97
N.W.2d 472 (1959) (restraints on defendant's witnesses). The basis of
the rule is the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial
trial. See Way v. United States, 285 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1960); Odell v.
Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873 (1951).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1970);
Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 873
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and gagging may interfere with the defendant's ability to con-
front his accusers and to communicate with his counsel,117 and if
the restraint creates considerable physical discomfort, it may
impair the defendant's ability to think clearly, which could be
essential to his defense."' Finally, the practice of shackling has
been criticized as so inhumane as to be out of place in a court
of justice.19
The defendant's right to appear in court free of physical re-
straints is, nevertheless, subject to certain widely recognized ex-
ceptions. For example, restraints may be used to prevent es-
cape,20 to prevent possible violence to spectators, officers of the
court or to the defendant himself,2 '. and to prevent disruption of
the trial 22 The general use of such restraints has been held to
lie within the sound discretion of the trial judge.2 3
C. SAmMin CoNVICTION FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
The use by the trial court of its power to summarily punish
criminal contempt also involves the abridgement of numerous
constitutional rights. Of particular importance when the defend-
ant is summarily punished for contempt for disruptive conduct is
the defendant's loss with respect to the contempt charge of nu-
merous Sixth Amendment rights, including his rights to trial by
jury, to information as to the nature of the accusation, to con-
(1951); Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390 (1916); State
v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591 (1877).
17. illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); People v. Harrington,
42 Cal. 165, 10 Am. R. 296 (1871).
18. Id.
19. French v. State, 377 P.2d 501 (Okla. Crin. 1963); cf. Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 367 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967); Clark v. State, 280 Ala. 493, 195 So. 2d
786 (1967); Commonwealth v. Chase, 350 Mass. 738, 217 N.E.2d 195
(1966).
21. See, e.g., Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963); State v. Boag, 104 Ariz. 362,
453 P.2d 508 (1969); State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97 N.W.2d 472(1959).
22. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639 (1967);
People v. Merkoures, 46 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956); State v. Mc-
Ginnis, 441 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Glass v. United States, 351 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1965);
Seale v. Hoffman. 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. IlL. 1969); State v. Randolph,
99 Ariz. 253, 408 P.2d 397 (1965); Commonwealth v. Dirring, 354 Mass.




frontation of adverse witnesses and to assistance of counsel.24
Although the power of trial judges to summarily punish defend-
ants for criminal contempt has been somewhat curtailed by de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court,2 5 most of these re-
strictions are not applicable where the contempt power is used to
preserve or restore order in the court.20
III. ILLINOIS v. ALLEN: PRESENT PROCEDURES
FOR CONTROLLING DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANTS
In Allen the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and
sentenced to 10 to 30 years in prison. His exclusion from his
trial because of his obstreperous behavior constituted the basis
of his petition for habeas corpus, which was denied by the federal
district court2 7 but granted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. 28 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
24. See generally Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of
Court, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 283 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (summary
punishment of contempt after trial not appropriate when judge has
adopted an adversary posture with respect to the alleged contemnor);
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (bias presumed when
contemnor attacks judge personally so that determination before an-
other judge is necessary); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)
(criminal contempt sentences imposed without jury trial cannot exceed
six months); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) (summary
punishment of contempt not appropriate after completion of trial at
which allegedly contemptuous behavior occurred).
26. E.g., in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), use of
summary contempt powers was recommended for purposes of maintain-
ing order in the court even though it was held inappropriate if delayed
until after trial. See also United States v. Meyer, No. 24,058 (D.C. Cir.
decided Jan. 20, 1972), where the court held post-trial use of summary
contempt power inappropriate, but stated that "the need to preserve
order [in the court] not only supports summary disposition, but also
outweighs the possibility of bias on the part of the trial judge."
27. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, May 24, 1968 (no reported opinion).
28. United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.
1969). The circumstances leading to Allen's exclusion are set forth in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
After his indictment and during the pretrial stage, the
petitioner [Allen] refused court-appointed counsel and indicated
to the trial court on several occasions that he wished to conduct
his own defense. After considerable argument by the petitioner,
the trial judge told him, "I'll let you be your own lawyer, but
I'll ask Mr. Kelly [court-appointed counsel] [to] sit in and pro-
tect the record for you, insofar as possible."
The trial began on September 9, 1957. After the State's
Attorney had accepted the first four jurors following their voir
dire examination, the petitioner began examining the first juror
and continued at great length. Finally, the trial judge inter-
[Vol. 56:699
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Circuit's decision 29 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
ruled that
there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways to han-
dle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him
... ; (2) cite him for contempt; [and] (3) take him out of
the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.3 0
Although it is clear that the Court engaged in a conscious
balancing of the rights of defendants against the interests of the
state, the foundation of the decision was that disruptive conduct
constitutes a waiver of the rights lost. As noted above, however,
the long-standing test for waiver of constitutional rights has been
whether the defendant intentionally relinquished or abandoned a
known right .3  The "waiver by misconduct" theory of Allen
does not appear to meet this standard 2 The decision requires
rupted the petitioner, requesting him to confine his questions
solely to matters relating to the prospective juror's qualifications.
At that point, the petitioner started to argue with the judge in a
most abusive and disrespectful manner. At last, and seemingly
in desperation, the judge asked appointed counsel to proceed
with the examination of the jurors. The petitioner continued to
talk, proclaiming that the appointed attorney was not going to
act as his lawyer. He terminated his remarks by saying, 'Vhen
I go out for lunchtime you're [the judge] going to be a corpse
here." At that point he tore the file which his attorney had and
threw the papers on the floor. The trial judge thereupon stated
to the petitioner, "One more outbreak of that sort and I'll re-
move you from the courtroom." This warning had no effect on
the petitioner. He continued to talk back to the judge, saying,
"There's not going to be no trial, either. I'm going to sit here
and you're going to talk and you can bring your shackles out and
straight jacket and put them on me and tape my mouth, but it
will do no good because there's not going to be no trial" After
more abusive remarks by the petitioner, the trial judge ordered
the trial to proceed in the petitioner's absence. The petitioner
was removed from the courtroom. The voir dire examination
then continued and the jury was selected in the absence of the
petitioner.
After a noon recess and before the jury was brought into the
courtroom, the petitioner, appearing before the judge, com-
plained about the fairness of the trial and his appointed attorney.
He also said he wanted to be present in the court during his
trial In reply, the judge said that the petitioner would be per-
mitted to remain in the courtroom if he "behaved [himself] and[did] not interfere with the introduction of the case." The jury
was brought in and seated. Counsel for the petitioner then
moved to exclude the witnesses from the courtroom. The [peti-
tioner] protested this effort on the part of his attorney, saying:
"There is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking
and rm going to keep on talking all through the trial. There's
not going to be no trial like this. I want my sister and my
friends here in court to testify for me." The trial judge there-
upon ordered the petitioner removed from the courtroom.
413 F.2d at 233-34.
29. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
30. Id. at 344.
31. See note 14 supra.
32. See Tigar, supra note 14.
1972]
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a warning before the defendant may be excluded,3 3 but he ap-
parently need not be informed that he has a right to be present.8 '
No warning of any kind is explicitly required prior to shackling
the defendant or citing him for contempt. Thus, when the de-
fendant is engaging in misconduct, waiver may occur where the
right is unknown and the waiver is unintentional.
While the Court intended to give trial judges considerable
discretion in controlling disruptive defendants,30 some guide-
lines for the use of the Allen controls are implicit in the Court's
opinion. Preliminarily, use of the Allen controls apparently was
not condoned in circumstances of slight disruption, but only in
cases where the defendant "insists on conducting himself in a
manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court
that the trial cannot be carried on. . . . 17 Even if this required
level of disruption had been articulated more clearly, however,
33. Specifically, the Court held that "a defendant can lose his right
to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he
will be removed he continues his disruptive behavior .... ." 397 U.S.
at 343 (emphasis added). Cf. the dictum of Mr. Justice Brennan, con-
curring: "Of course, no action against an unruly defendant is per-
missible except after he has been fully and fairly informed that his con-
duct is wrong and intolerable, and warned of the possible consequences
of continued misbehavior." 397 U.S. at 350.
34. 397 U.S. at 343. See also Tigar, supra note 14, at 10-11. That
the Court is well aware of the importance of informing an individual
both of his constitutional rights and of the consequences of waiving
them in order for the waiver to be truly informed is clear. Equally
clear is the Court's ability to articulate such requirements precisely when
it intends to do so. See Miranda v. State, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 471-73 (1966).
35. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
36. According to the Court, "trial judges confronted with disruptive,
contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient
discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for
maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all
situations." 397 U.S. at 343.
An amendment to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure has been proposed to reflect the Allen decision. The amendment
merely provides, however, that "[t]he further progress of the trial to
and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented whenever
a defendant, initially present . . . engages in conduct which is such as
to justify his being excluded from the courtroom." Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. As the Advisory Committee note points out, "[t]he de-
cision in Allen makes no attempt to spell out standards to guide a judge
in selecting the appropriate method to insure courtroom decorum and
there is no attempt to do so in the revision of the rule."
37. 397 U.S. at 343. It should be noted, however, that this limi-
tation may apply only where the defendant is expelled, so that possibly
binding and gagging, and almost surely contempt, may be used before
the defendant has engaged in conduct that would justify expulsion.
DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANTS
it would be inadequate. It does not specifically require judges
to distinguish between isolated incidents of disruption and con-
duct calculated to throw the proceedings into disorder.38 Neither
does it require differentiation between inexcusable disruption
and protestation motivated by a justifiable complaint.30 In view
of the harshness of the controls and the attendant loss of rights
held in Allen to be constitutionally permissible, such distinctions
should not go unrecognized.
As to which sanction is appropriate in a particular situation,
the Court expressed some preferences. The binding and gagging
of defendants, the Court said, suffers from the defects of in-
humaneness, jury prejudice and interference with attorney-client
communication.4 0 The use of the contempt power, it went on to
say, was unlikely to be effective, and, in the case of civil con-
tempt, enabled the defendant to delay the proceedings at will.4"
This presumably leaves expulsion of the defendant as the pre-
ferred method of control, even though it controverts the basic
right of the defendant to be personally present at his trial.
38. Under the decision's rationale of preserving order and decorum
in the courtroom it is not necessary for trial judges to consider the
motives of the disruptive defendant, but only to consider the effects of
his conduct on the proceedings. Indeed, under the rationale of the case
such distinctions probably would not even be desirable because of the
strong possibility of discriminatory treatment by the judge according
to the popularity of the cause the defendant might be espousing. Never-
theless, a trial judge could, consistent with the theory of the decision,
be required to distinguish between occasional irreverent outbursts and
a course of conduct that unreasonably disrupted the proceedings.
39. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, who asked
'Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from the courtroom during a
trial because he was insisting on his constitutional rights, albeit vocifer-
ously, no matter how obnoxious his philosophy might have been to the
to the bench that tried him? Would we uphold contempt in that sit-
uation?" 397 U.S. at 355. Possibly the answer is not unqualifiedly in
the negative. In People v. De Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556
(1956), defendant was excluded from his trial on account of his
obstreperous behavior which may have been directed at least in part
to the incompetence of his defense counsel. Without discussion of the
issue raised by Mr. Justice Douglas, the court stated that defendant
had waived his right to be personally present, but reversed his con-
viction on the grounds that the ineffectiveness of his counsel had resulted
in a denial of due process.
40. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
41. Mr. Justice Black dismissed the court's criminal contempt
power as inefficacious. He had previously expressed strong reservations
about its use. See In -re McConnel, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); Green v. United
States, 356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) ("an anomaly
in the law [requiring] a fundamental and searching reconsideration");
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Despite this expression of preference among the controls, the
Court refused to go further and establish a mandatory hierarchy
or priorities among them. The Court imposed no express re-
quirement that the control selected be correlated to the type or
level of disruption the defendant has caused. Nor did the Court
suggest that trial judges attempt to restore order by less serious
methods, such as a stern warning from the bench, or by a short
recess during which the defendant could ponder the cost of future
disruption and defense counsel could impress upon him the im-
portance of his presence in court unshackled and the dangers of
jury prejudice attendant upon misconduct. Such restrictions by
the court would have been desirable because they would prevent
or minimize the abridgment of the defendant's rights with virtu-
ally no reduction of the judge's ability to deal flexibly with dis-
ruptive conduct.
The Court's requirement of a prior warning is, of course,
desirable, but the warning required should be more specific. ' 2
Additionally, the trial judge should be required to guard against
jury prejudice that may result when the court rebukes the de-
fendant, either by giving the warning after the jury has been
excused, or by instructing the jury to disregard the warning as
irrelevant to the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Finally, the Court indicated that once a defendant has lost
a right because of misconduct, he may "reclaim" it as soon as he
is willing to conduct himself properly.48 This rule is consistent
with the rationale of the decision that Allen controls are not in-
tended to be penalties per se, but are imposed only to preserve
order and decorum in the courtroom. 44 It would have been de-
sirable, however, in view of the importance of the constitutional
rights waived, to articulate more clearly the procedures to be
followed. In view of the difficulty for a shackled and gagged or
absent defendant to "reclaim" his right to presence, for example,
the judge should be required to inquire periodically regarding
the defendant's intentions.
42. See note 60 infra.
43. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
44. Cf. the language of Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, in which
he suggests that while the
defendant is excluded from his trial, the court should make rea-
sonable efforts to enable him to communicate with his attorney
and, if possible, to keep apprised of the progress of his trial.
Once the court has removed the contumacious defendant it is
not weakness to mitigate the disadvantages of his expulsion as
far as technologically possible ....
397 U.S. at 351.
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Although much can be said for allowing trial judges consid-
erable discretion in controlling disruptive conduct,4 5 the Court's
failure to articulate specific guidelines for the use of Allen con-
trols is unfortunate for several reasons. First, the absence of
definite guidelines allows considerable room for discrimination
against and arbitrary treatment of unpopular defendants. Sec-
ond, the Court's position fails to recognize that decorum in the
courtroom can be undermined not only by disruptive defendants
but also by harsh and arbitrary treatment of defendants. Third,
the lack of guidelines fails to protect against the possibility of
loss of express constitutional rights in excess of that necessary
to maintain order. Finally, trial in absentia or with strongly
fettered defendants, with its connotations of totalitarianism,
tends to undercut public confidence in the criminal justice
system.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTROL OF DISRUPTIVE
DEFENDANTS
To meet the need for restrictions on trial judges' power to
control disruptive defendants, the following guidelines are pro-
posed. Each guideline attempts to reconcile the acknowledged
need for flexibility in dealing with such disruption with the de-
sirability of minimizing the loss of defendants' rights. The
guidelines are not intended as mandatory rules, but rather as
suggestive of considerations relevant to the problem of how
disruption should be dealt with in a particular case.40 They
should serve the additional function of providing standards
45. In addition to being in the best position to assess the dis-
ruption of the proceedings caused by the unruly conduct, the judge is
also best situated to determine the nature of the defendant's conduct,
e.g., whether it is an uncontrollable outburst or conduct designed and
intended to disrupt the proceedings. Moreover, the judge is best situated
to observe and deal with the likelihood of jury prejudice. Finally, the
judge bears the ultimate responsibility for the proceedings and thus
must be concerned with such considerations as the safety of the officers
of the court, the jurors and the spectators.
46. A function is contemplated similar to that presently accorded
to ADVIsoRY Co mnrEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREsS oF TE AmERcAN
BAR ASSociAnox, STANDARDs RELATG To FAIR T L AND FREE PRESS,
to which judges turn for guidance in problems involving publicity of
trial proceedings. While nonmandatory guidelines may have less force
and effect than formal rules of procedure, they are designed to call
attention to all of the issues that arise when disruption occurs or threat-
ens to occur, without unduly infringing on the freedom which judges




against which the judge's exercise of discretion can be measured
in a particular case for purposes of appellate review.
The discussion of the guidelines is organized around the two
main questions that arise when the judge is confronted with
conduct that threatens to disrupt the proceedings. First, the
judge must determine whether the conduct is so intolerable as
to require a response from the bench. Second, the judge must
determine what the particular response to the disruptive conduct
should be. The second question includes the determinations of
which response among his alternatives is most appropriate, what
procedures should be followed in imposing it and what steps
should be taken to mitigate its prejudicial and punitive effects.
A. IDENTIFICATION OF DISRuPTIvE BEHAVIOR
The imposition of an Allen sanction is not an appropriate
response to every instance of courtroom discourtesy on the part
of the defendant, but should be reserved for situations in which
the conduct of the defendant is so serious as to actually disrupt
the proceedings. Some types of conduct, although irritating to
the judge, do not actually disrupt the trial, and anything more
than a warning by the judge would be inappropriate. 47
Some conduct, although disruptive or potentially disruptive,
may be controlled by procedures short of those approved in
Allen, such as a stern warning regarding the possible conse-
quences of defendant's behavior, or a short recess during which
the defendant might be persuaded to behave properly, or both.
Such procedures, where they may be effective, should be used
before resorting to the more severe sanctions approved in Allen
since they do not infringe on fundamental rights of the accused
and may be employed without undue delay or difficulty. Fur-
thermore, overreaction to minimally disruptive conduct in the
47. In Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 441 Pa. 28, 269 A.2d 727 (1970),
defendant, suddenly unrepresented by counsel after an unexplained de-
nial of his motion for a new counsel, had been sentenced to one year
imprisonment on a contempt charge arising from his refusal to answer
pre-trial questions of legal strategy in a pro se capacity. On appeal, the
conviction was reversed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holding de-
fendant's conduct not contemptuous as a matter of law. The court re-
cognized that the use of the contempt power had been upheld in Allen
as a method for controlling courtroom disruption, but suggested that
its use be limited to situations of "scurrilous [and] abusive language




form of harsh responses from the bench is as detrimental to the
integrity of the judicial process as the disruptive behavior itself.48
Additionally, the judge should distinguish between isolated
instances of misconduct, and courses of conduct calculated to
disrupt the proceedings. In the former, the judge should adopt
a "wait and see" attitude after appropriately warning the de-
fendant. Where the defendant manifests an obvious purpose of
disrupting the proceedings, however, the judge should be free to
respond more quickly and forcefully. 49 Since the rationale of the
procedures approved in Allen is the necessity of order in the
courtroom, the likelihood of continued disruption is a variable
which the judge should consider in determining whether to re-
spond to disruption and what response is appropriate.
The use of Allen controls is inappropriate where the objec-
tionable conduct does not occur while the court is in session.50
Logically, such conduct cannot disrupt the proceedings in the
manner envisioned in Allen. More importantly, however, the
warning to the defendant required by Allen cannot be given
where the defendant's conduct occurs while the court is not in
session.51 Finally, the judge should not resort to the procedures
approved in Allen in reliance solely upon the recommendations
48. It should be remembered that where a matter lies within the
discretion of the trial judge, appellate courts are reluctant to interfere
with the trial judge's decision. But see Benton v. Dover Dist. Ct., 274
A.2d 876, 878 (N.H. 1971), where the defendant was sentenced to six
months imprisonment on account of his reference to the court as a
"kangaroo court." The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that in
light of "the relative severity of the contempt sentence ... as compared
with the gravity of the contemptuous conduct, we are of the opinion that
the portion of the sentence already served by the plaintiff constitutes
adequate punishment."
49. In Morris v. State, 249 Ark. 1005, 1010, 462 S.W.2d 842, 845
(1971), defendant kicked over a chair, addressed the court in loud
language, and announced that he "was going to pull a Bobby Seales
[sic]." In chambers the judge explained that defendant would have to
observe courtroom decorum if he wished to remain in court during his
trial. Upon defendant's stated refusal to conduct himself properly, thejudge ordered defendant returned to jail. Defendant's subsequent con-
viction was properly affirmed in reliance upon Allen.
50. In Jones v. State, 262 Md. 61, 276 A.2d 666 (1971), the defendant
had been ordered shackled and gagged at the commencement of the
trial by the judge who had observed an unexplained altercation between
defendant and sheriff's deputies while the judge was passing the en-
trance to the courtroom. On appeal, defendant's conviction was re-
versed and the case remanded for a new trial on the ground that de-
fendant had been denied due process.
51. Id. In Jones the court assumed that the warning required by
Allen to be given before the defendant is excluded must also be given
before the defendant may be shackled and gagged.
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of others without making an independent assessment of the situa-
tion.
52
The judge should not, of course, be oblivious to conduct of
the defendant that occurs before the trial commences or when the
court is not in session which is indicative of a threat of disrup-
tion.53 He can warn the defendant at the outset of the pro-
ceedings about the standard of conduct expected of him and of
the results of misconduct during the trial.5 4 If such information
suggests the possibility of violence or attempted escape, the
judge should take added security precautions such as increasing
the number of guards and searching spectators. In extreme
cases, the judge may even restrain the defendant with hand-
cuffs, but before taking such action the possibility of jury preju-
dice should be weighed. 5 Generally, however, conduct that oc-
curs while the court is not in session should not be the sole or
final provocation that results in the use of an Allen control.
The judge should not impose Allen controls unless he is
personally cognizant of the disruptive conduct.5 6 If, for ex-
52. In United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970),
the court said, with regard to precautionary security measures, "We stress
that the discretion is that of the district judge. He may not . . . delegate
that discretion to the Marshal."
53. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937);
Hall v. State, 199 Ind. 592, 159 N.E. 420 (1928); State v. McKay, 63 Nev.
118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946); State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 206 A.2d
200 (1965); DeWolf v. State, 245 P.2d 107 (Okla. Crim. 1952).
54. This procedure was suggested by the court in Jones v. State,
262 Md. 61, 276 A.2d 666 (1971). Although the prior warning may be
subject to the criticism that it demonstrates prejudice on the part of the
judge, it is difficult to see how the practice is more objectionable than
requiring the defendant to wear shackles during the proceeding solely
on account of his pretrial conduct, a practice which is permitted in many
jurisdictions. See, e.g., cases cited in note 53 supra. Furthermore, the
judge could avoid the charge of prejudice by giving brief instructions as
to the standard of conduct expected of the defendant at the outset of
every criminal trial, thereby eliminating the implication that he bears
prejudice toward particular defendants. In either case, of course, the
instructions should be given out of the presence of the jury.
55. In such cases the Samuel court also required the judge to state
for the record, and out of the presence of the jury, the reasons for the
extraordinary security measures and to give counsel an opportunity to
comment thereon for purposes of appellate determination of whether the
judge abused his discretion. 431 F.2d at 615.
56. In Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 214 (1971), the Supreme
Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction for contempt for dis-
ruptively violating courtroom procedure, said that "[ijnstant action
may be necessary where the misbehavior is in the presence of the judge
and is known to him and where immediate corrective steps are needed to
restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of the court." Be-
cause the judge did not take instant action, however, and because he was
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ample, an altercation occurs in the courtroom which the judge
does not observe fully, the defendant should not be penalized on
the strength of a description of the occurrence by the marshal
or some other officer of the court without giving the defendant
an opportunity to relate his version of the incident. Additionally,
the prosecutor and the defense counsel might be given some op-
portunity to present arguments regarding the propriety of a
response from the bench.57 It must be remembered that the ex-
ercise of the judge's discretionary power to control disruption
should not be uninformed.
Finally, the judge should consider the cause of the defend-
ant's misconduct. Where the defendant is expressing a legitimate
grievance, such as incompetence of his defense counsel, it would
seem that the judge ought properly to direct his attention to the
cause of the defendant's conduct rather than to the defendant's
response to it. It is true, of course, that if the defendant is ex-
pressing a legitimate grievance, he would normally be able to
raise it on appeal 58 Nevertheless, it is more efficient and more
fair to deal with such situations at the trial level than to make use
of the procedures approved in Allen and to trust that the legiti-
macy of the defendant's complaint will be vindicated in the ap-
pellate process.59
B. DETERMNATION OF THE PROPER METHOD OF CONTROL
The judge should warn the defendant about the possible
consequences of his behavior before resorting to the procedures
approved in Allen. 60 The Allen opinion appears to require a
warning prior to exclusion of the defendant and may require a
not personally aware of the contemptuous action when it occurred, de-
fendant should be given a fair opportunity to show that the version of
the event related to the judge was inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete.
57. See note 55 supra.
58. See, e.g., People v. De Simone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E. 2d 566
(1956).
59. Even where the defendant is not voicing a legitimate grievance
-e.g., disruption resulting from animosity toward an adverse witness-
the judge should consider the likelihood of continued disruption once the
cause has been eliminated in determining whether and how to react to
the defendant's conduct.
60. In particular the judge's warning should call the defendant's
attention to what conduct is objectionable and why it will not be per-
mitted, to what actions may be taken if the disruption is continued, to
the loss of rights and attendant disadvantages and to the fact that the
trial will continue even in defendant's absence. See Flaum & Thompson,
The Case of the Disruptive Defendant: fIlinois v. Allen, 61 J. Cmm.
L.C. & P.S., 327, 334 (1970).
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warning regardless of the sanction chosen.6 1 Moreover, to con-
strue misconduct as an intentional waiver of the constitutional
right to presence, the defendant must be cognizant of the fact
that his conduct may result in the loss of such a right.6 2 Finally,
a stern warning from the judge may well have a deterrent effect
on future misconduct, thereby rendering more severe procedures
unnecessary. In view of the importance of the constitutional
rights involved, the gravity of the sanctions that can be imposed
and the relative ease with which a warning can be made, a
warning should be given prior to sanctioning the defendant's
conduct except where it would be obviously futile.0
When the disruption cannot be controlled by a warning, and
except where obviously futile, the judge should attempt to con-
trol the disruption by notifying the defendant that he will be
charged with criminal contempt of court.64 Even though the use
61. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, stated, "Of course, no action
against an unruly defendant is permissible except after he has been fully
and fairly informed that his conduct is wrong and intolerable, and
warned of the possible consequences of continued misbehavior." 397
U.S. at 350. The American Bar Association Advisory Committee on
the Judge's Function has taken a similar position even with respect to use
of the contempt power:
No sanction other than censure should be imposed by the trialjudge unless (a) it is clear from the identity of the offender and
the character of his acts that disruptive conduct was willfully
contemptuous, or (b) the conduct warranting the sanction was
preceded by a clear warning that the conduct is impermissible
and that specified sanctions may be imposed for its repetition.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT FOR STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE JUDGES ROLE IN DEALING WITH TRIAL DISRUPTIONS (Tentative Draft),
at 18 (1971).
62. See note 14 supra.
63. Rather than giving a pro forma warning in situations where the
procedure would obviously be ineffectual both in controlling the de-
fendant's conduct and in informing him of possible waiver of rights, the
judge should recess the proceedings or excuse the jury and then effect-
ively communicate the warning to the defendant.
64. Although the Allen Court assumed that use of the court's con-
tempt power would generally be ineffectual, the loss of rights important
to the presentation of the defense of the accused dictates that this less
severe control should be used before resorting to shackling or exclusion
in situations in which it might be effective. In particular, where the
court is faced with a highly excitable defendant who has merely lost
control of his conduct, as opposed to a defendant who is consciously
and intentionally attempting to disrupt the proceedings, the contempt
power should be used. State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925, 945 (Alaska
1971). Although summary conviction for contempt is within the court's
power for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order in the court-
room, if the contempt power is sufficient to restore order in a particular
situation then merely notifying the defendant that he will be charged
with contempt is likely to be as effective as summary conviction for
contempt. The distinction between charging the defendant with con-
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of the contempt power is more harsh than exclusion or shackling
in that it goes beyond mere control of disruption and results in
punishment, it is less violative of traditional rights of the ac-
cused than is exclusion and is more humane than shackling.
Moreover, if citation rather than summary conviction is used,
the contempt proceedings will be delayed until the end of the
trial and should thus be referred to another judge for proceedings
at which the defendant may be able to present evidence rele-
vant to guilt or punishment.65
Expulsion of the defendant is preferable to binding and
gagging him.66 Most of the interests to be served by his presence
do not exist when he is bound and gagged. 7 Moreover, his
presence in a highly fettered condition is likely to have a preju-
dicial effect on the jury not easily corrected by admonitions
from the bench.68 Finally, binding and gagging have proved
somewhat ineffective in quelling disruption"9 and tend to offend
the very courtroom decorum the procedure is intended to protect.
When the defendant is removed from the courtroom the
judge should attempt to minimize the disadvantages to his
tempt and summary conviction can be seen by comparing FED. RL Cnmi.
P., Rules 42 (b) and 42 (a).
65. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
66. According to the Allen court:
Trying a defendant for a crime while he sits bound and gagged
before the jury would to an extent comply with that part of the
Sixth Amendment's purposes that accords the defendant an
opportunity to confront the witnesses at the trial. But even to
contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses a feeling
that no person should be tried while shackled and gagged ex-
cept as a last resort.
397 U.S. at 344.
Cf. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring:
In particular shackling and gagging a defendant is surely the
least acceptable of [the methods]. It offends not only judicial
dignity and decorum, but also that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the law.
397 U.S. at 350-51.
67. E.g., although present, the defendant is unable to communicate
with his attorney.
68. That the presence of the shackled and gagged defendant will
always prejudice the jury against the defendant is not entirely certain.
One of the jurors in the conspiracy trial of the "Chicago 8" commented
on the impact of the shackling and gagging of defendant Seale: "I am
not sure I could have found Seale guilty no matter what the evidence,
and I know that the other jurors felt the same." Juror Kay Richard,
quoted in Chicago Sunday Sun-Times, Feb. 22, 1970 § 1, at 4, col. 4.
69. Bobby Seale was intially bound with ordinary metal handcuffs
and a cloth gag to restrain him. The metal shackles were replaced with
leather restraints to prevent jangling, but numerous recesses were re-
quired to permit the choking defendant to catch his breath. Chicago
Sun-Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 1, at 4, col 4.
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defense that are created by his absence.7 0  Furthermore, the
defendant should be given the continuing opportunity to return
to the courtroom upon assurance that he will conduct himself
properly.7 1 The procedures approved in Allen were not, with the
possible exception of contempt, intended as punishments in them-
selves, but were intended to control disruptive behavior. Thus
the adverse effects of a particular procedure should be mini-
mized while it is in effect, and terminated when it has served
its purpose.
Because of the distraction that will normally accompany
disruptive behavior and the judge's attempts to control it, the
judge should guard against the possibility of jury prejudice.
Wherever possible, the judge should address the defendant with
respect to his conduct out of the presence of the jury, either in
his chambers or after excusing the jury.72  Additionally, the
judge should instruct the jury to consider disruptive conduct
and the court's response to it as irrelevant to the question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence.
70. See the language of Mr. Justice Brennan quoted at note 44
supra. With regard to the excluded defendant, many alternatives are
available to minimize the disadvantages that result from his absence.
First, the length of the trial day could be decreased or the length of
recesses increased to permit the defense counsel to inform the defendant
about the progress of the trial and to inquire about his desire to return
to the courtroom. Second, the defendant could be provided with a
transcript or condensed record of the proceedings. Third, the defendant
could be provided with an electronic intercommunication link such as
closed circuit television. Although this procedure would be highly de-
sirable, it is probably prohibitively expensive for many jurisdictions and
in any case is not required where the defendant has, in fact, waived his
right to be present. Nevertheless, reasonable efforts should be made by
the judge to mitigate the disadvantages of the particular method chosen
to control the disruption.
71. According to the Allen court, "the right to be present can, of
course, be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing" to conduct him-
self properly. 397 U.S. at 343. Preferably, however, the judge should
be required to take the initiative in inquiring at frequent intervals as
to whether the defendant intends to behave himself and therefore regain
his right to presence. Putting this burden on the judge rather than the
defendant is justifiable both because of the practical difficulties involved
in the excluded defendant communicating with the judge and in order to
minimize mistake on the part of the defendant as to the extent and du-
ration of the sanction imposed on him.
72. Although security problems that arise in cases where there is
danger of escape or violence make conferences in chambers undesirable
in such situations, generally this procedure is preferable to excusing
the jury because of the speed and flexibility of retiring to chambers.
In any case the jury should view as little of the disruption and thejudge's reaction to it as possible.
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V. CONCLUSION
Faced with a rising incidence of disruption in the criminal
courtroom, trial judges have been vested with broad powers
under the Allen decision to control such misconduct on the part
of the defendant. Although the judge needs broad and flexible
powers to deal with the many and varied problems that arise in
connection with disruptive defendants, unwarranted or overly
harsh judicial responses to disruptive conduct unduly infringe
upon the rights of the accused and are offensive to the decorum
the judge is to uphold. Thus guidelines have been suggested that
hopefully will aid judges in determining what conduct is dis-
ruptive and how disruption is most appropriately controlled.
